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Abstract 
There has been a rise and fall in interest in federalism in the context of European integration. This article assesses the 
federal nature of the EU. It draws in particular on the work of Michael Burgess who has been one of the key thinkers on 
this issue. Because there are many types of ‘federalisms’ available across the globe, it is helpful to make a comparison 
with another political system to offer a base line. In this article I explore to what extent the EU already has federal 
features. With the help of the work of Burgess I seek to look beyond the specific characteristics of the EU and reflect on 
how a comparison with this other polity can offer us insights into what is going on within the EU political system. 
Drawing on the comparison with Canada, I seek to identify the characteristics of the EU that are already those of a 
federation. Therefore, the guiding question of this article is: compared to Canada, what particular features does the EU 
have that reminds us of a federation and what features is it still lacking? It finds that the EU has a considerable amount 
of federal features (federation), but that a federal tradition, a federal ideology and advocacy to a federal goal 
(federalism) are mostly absent. 
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1. Introduction 
The European Union (EU) is typically categorised as an 
international organisation. For instance, the Union of 
International Associations (UIA), founded in 1910, 
states on its homepage: “an Intergovernmental Organi-
zation IGO is an organization composed primarily of 
sovereign states, or of other intergovernmental organi-
zations. IGOs are established by treaty or other agree-
ment that acts as a charter creating the group. 
Examples include the United Nations, the World Bank, 
or the European Union” (UIA, 2015).1 Following this 
definition it is easy to see that the EU indeed is an in-
ternational organisation—the founders and subscribers 
                                                          
1 The UIA subdivides ‘international organizations’ into three 
categories namely: inter-governmental organizations, inter-
national non-governmental organizations, and multinational 
enterprises. 
are sovereign nations and it is based on a treaty.  
At the same time, those who have studied the EU 
more closely would not have any difficulty identifying 
the EU’s state-like features. William Wallace famously 
characterised the European Community (EC), at the 
time, as ‘less than a federation; more than a regime’ 
(Wallace, 1983). Since then, the EC has evolved into 
the European Union (EU) but Wallace’s characterisa-
tion still resonates with many scholars today (see 
Joerges, 2005, p. 14). In fact, over the past two dec-
ades, when forced to categorise what kind of political 
system the EU is, we find many that characterise the 
EU as being ‘sui generis’ in some form or other (for an 
overview see Phelan, 2012, who seeks to understand 
this issue from an International Relations perspective). 
Ingeborg Tömmel (2012) offers a nice comparison of 
the EU with ideal type federations and concludes it is 
not a fully-fledged federation; she does not expect it to 
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become one in the near future, yet she finds that it 
does have some characteristics of a federation. She 
thus names the EU ‘a federation sui generis’ (Tömmel, 
2011). John-Erik Fossum (2006) also seeks to impose 
some discipline on exactly how the EU is a sui generis 
polity. He differentiates between those who see the EU 
as departing from a nation-state, those that see it as 
part of state withering or transnationalization, those 
that view it as a case of nation-state transformation, or 
as a subset of fledgling states. 
In light of the above brief discussion of the key con-
cepts of intergovernmental organization versus federa-
tion what would it take for the EU to resemble more a 
federation than an international organisation? Very 
few scholars of European integration have been so 
bold as to state that the EU is already starting to re-
semble a federation.2 Yet one could list a number of 
characteristics of the EU that overlap with those of 
federations. Thus, I pose the question in this article: 
what particular features does the EU have that reminds 
us of a federation and what features is it still lacking? I 
am posing this question because the answer to this 
question will shed light on the amount of federal de-
velopment achieved in the EU, but also where this de-
velopment falls short of a possible yardstick, both 
theoretically and in comparison to an existing case. 
Specifically, this article seeks to study this question 
theoretically by examining the concept of federalism 
and federation drawing on Europeanist literature on 
federalism, in particular through the work of Michael 
Burgess. It also offers a concrete comparison with an 
established federal state, Canada, as an example of a 
federal state. I am not the first to make a comparison 
between the EU’s development to that of another fed-
eral state. However, most scholars who have embarked 
on such a comparison have tended to concentrate on 
the comparison with the United States (US). As David 
McKay points out, it is the political system that most 
resembles the EU in terms of its size, and political and 
economic development (McKay, 2001, p. 4).3 I have 
chosen to concentrate on Canada rather than the US, 
not only because the comparison with the US is well 
documented in the literature and not terribly success-
ful (Hueglin, 2013). Rather, because at the end of the 
day the EU needs to deal with multinationalism (as 
does Canada).4 Furthermore, Canada is a much more 
                                                          
2 Examples of scholars who have described the EU this way 
see Kelemen (2003, 2007), Hueglin (2013), Börzel and Hosli 
(2003), Börzel (2005), Kreppel (2006) and Verdun (2015a). 
Wood and Verdun (2011) have compared Canada and the EU, 
thereby implicitly examining the EU as a federal-like entity, 
see for their more recent studies: Verdun and Wood (2013). 
Others who have made this explicit comparison are, among 
others, Simeon (2006), Wolinetz (2011), Hueglin (2013).  
3 For others who have made the comparison with the US see 
in particular Fabbrini (2005) and Menon and Schain (2006). 
4 Multinationalism in Canada has various characteristics, in-
decentralised federation than is the US and for the 
foreseeable future the EU-version of federalism would 
need to maintain those features. Also the experience 
with US politics is more idiosyncratic with its strongly 
polarised two party system. Finally, seen that the US 
has developed as one of the world’s superpowers also 
gives that country a unique role in global politics. This 
superpower status, over time, has reinforced executive 
power in a way that is different in a country such as 
Canada that has a less forceful stance in the globe. Al-
so, both the Canada and the US constitutions are sub-
ject to occasional challenges before the courts. But in 
the United States the courts have tended to widen 
federal and narrow state powers whereas the opposite 
has typically occurred in Canada (Parliament of Canada, 
2016). For all these reasons a comparison with Canada 
rather than the US is much more attractive for the pur-
poses of seeking to understand how much the EU al-
ready resembles a federation. The remainder of this 
article is thus structured as follows. In section 2 I pro-
vide a literature review of EU scholars who have exam-
ined the question of federalism in the EU context. In 
the third section I assess what federalism is; in the sub-
sequent section I examine what federalism means in 
Europe; next I look at what federalism is in Canada; 
then I offer a comparison of the two systems (Canada 
and the EU) in the penultimate section; and offer some 
conclusions in the final section. 
2. The Federalist Political Thought in the EU and the 
Work of Burgess 
The early developments, post Second World War, were 
inspired by federalist thought, and were brought for-
ward by people such as Altiero Spinelli (Glencross, 
2009; Glencross & Trechsel, 2010; Pinder, 2007) and 
Jean Monnet (Duchêne, 1994; cf. Triandafyllidou & 
Gropas, 2015). Federalist ideas had been around for 
centuries, of course, but there was not a unified view 
on federalism as conceptualised by 16th and 17th centu-
ry political philosophers, in particular Johannes Althu-
sius and Jean Bodin. In the 1960s, scholars, for example 
Riker (1964), were influential in streamlining some of 
this diversity but at this time the federalist thought was 
less prominent in the EC. Burgess (2000) points to how 
the federalist thought of Althusius and a later philoso-
pher, Proudhon, left more room for overlapping, divid-
                                                                                           
cluding even the perhaps banal issue of having more than 
one official language. The Canadian constitution stipulates 
that every province (except Quebec, New Brunswick and 
Manitoba) may decide which their official language is or if it 
wants more than one official language (and those need not 
necessarily be either English or French). In the case of Que-
bec, New Brunswick and Manitoba, however, the require-
ment is that as long as English and French are at least part of 
those official languages they could add one or more official 
languages (see Parliament of Canada 2016). 
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ed and shared sovereignty rather than the conception 
of federalism à la Bodin (Burgess, 2000, p. 14). Even if 
there were numerous federalist political thinkers with 
not always completely overlapping ideas, federal ideas 
were at the heart of the proposals to pool sovereignty, 
transfer sovereignty to the supranational level and to 
limit some national sovereignty. 
Students of European Studies sometimes ask the 
question of the EU’s finalité—what exactly will the EU 
become, with as an important follow-up question, is 
the EU developing into a federal state? If so, would it 
be created with a big bang or more incrementally? This 
vision of a ‘big bang’ was held by some during the Con-
vention on the Future of Europe, which took place be-
tween December 2001 and July 2003 that ended in the 
creation of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for 
Europe, which ultimately failed.5 Others have held that 
European integration has always been and is likely to 
remain, for the foreseeable future, a gradual process. 
Through incremental development integration would 
deepen, and in so doing at some point end up being 
more like a federation (see Borrell, 2015; Duff, Pinder, 
& Pryce 1994). Given that process, the question would 
be, when would one identify the EU as actually being a 
federation?  
Seeking an answer to this question is one of the 
reasons for concentrating on the work of Michael Bur-
gess—a scholar who has brought together political 
thought on federalism and its application to the EU 
(and federations across the globe). In Federalism and 
European Union Burgess provides an overview of fed-
eral thinking in the EC from 1972–1987 (Burgess, 
1989)—a period just before the relaunch of European 
integration in the early 1990s. In 2012 Burgess wrote 
about this revival period in the early 1990s: “The ratifi-
cation of the Treaty on European Union…underlined 
                                                          
5 The Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe failed due 
to a host of reasons, but not in the last place because the 
ambition of the leaders of the Convention incrementally add-
ed more symbolic features to the proposed revised EU con-
stitutional structure that made it look more like a 
federation—something that in the end did not find sufficient 
support among citizens. The Heads of State or Government 
signed off on the text, but at the end of the day the ratifica-
tion of that particular text stranded following the outcomes 
of the referendums in France and the Netherlands, where a 
majority voted against approval of the ratification of consti-
tutional treaty. People were concerned about the labels used 
to describe the changes, such as the word ‘constitution’ in 
the title (see Hobolt, 2006). It also was a very difficult docu-
ment for every day citizens to understand. With some delay 
the more ‘symbolic’ features were removed and essentially a 
‘watered-down version’ (Verdun, 2013) eventually became 
the Lisbon Treaty, signed in December 2007, which was rati-
fied and entered into force on 1 December 2009 (see for 
more details about the changes in decision-making before 
and after Lisbon a collection of papers in Hosli, Kreppel, 
Plechanavová, & Verdun, 2015).  
the federal trajectory of European political integration 
and paved the way a decade later for the European Un-
ion (EU) to prepare the practical proposal for a Consti-
tutional Treaty, subsequently replaced in 2007 by the 
Lisbon Treaty which was formally ratified in 2009” 
(Burgess, 2012, pp. 1-2). Later in the same volume Bur-
gess (2012, p. 320) notes: “Rather than adopt one par-
ticular approach to federalism, we have suggested that 
theoretical pluralism is the most profitable way of 
thinking about the federal spirit”. And he also thinks 
that: “…federalism as a process—the notion of federal-
izing or federalization—to have the most practical utili-
ty when applied to the new federal models….Today 
federalism as a process offers a convincing explanation 
of what is happening in…the EU” (Burgess, 2012, p. 
320). Michael Burgess’s interest in federalism extended 
much more widely than merely the study of Europe 
and European integration. In 1990, he edited a volume 
that examined federalism in Canada (Burgess, 1990). 
This work was followed soon after by another book on 
Canada, co-edited with Alain-G. Gagnon (Burgess & 
Gagnon, 1993).6 His study of Canada is another reason 
to draw on Burgess in this article. 
3. Federalism—A Concept 
The concept of federalism is different from that of fed-
eration (Burgess 1986; Burgess & Gagnon, 1993, p. xiii; 
Gagnon, 2010, p. 3; Gagnon, Keil, & Mueller, 2015; 
King, 1982). The latter refers more to institutions; the 
former is broader and includes traditions, ideology in-
cluding perhaps the advocacy for an end goal. Gagnon 
differentiates between ‘territorial’ and ‘multinational’ 
federations. The former seeks to treat all citizens the 
same and have representation by territory (a classic 
example being the United States) (cf. Burgess, 2006b). 
A multinational federation acknowledges the existence 
of various nations within the federation and realizes it 
needs to accommodate these different minorities (e.g. 
Belgium, Canada) (Gagnon, 2010, p. 5). 
In Comparative Federalism, Burgess provides his in-
sights on what federalism is (Burgess, 2006a). He 
stresses it has both an empirical and theoretical di-
mension and is multi-faceted which makes it difficult to 
have a full-fledged theory of federalism (Burgess, 
2006a, pp. 1, 4). He defines federalism as: “the active 
promotion of support for federation” (Burgess, 2006a, 
p. 2) with federation being “a particular kind of state” 
(Burgess, 2006a). 
Simplifying a thorough review of the literature that 
he provides in his study, one could summarize his 
views on the matter as follows. Federalism is a suitable 
                                                          
6 Burgess at this time also produced an important book on 
the UK, which focused on the British tradition of federalism, 
which was very timely indeed as the UK was contemplating 
devolution in the 1990s (Burgess, 1995). 
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form of government when a number of circumstances 
come together. Following Edward Freeman he points 
to federation being a mechanism of compromise be-
tween opposing forces. (Burgess, 2006a, p. 13; cf. 
Freeman, 1893). He acknowledges that a federation is 
often chosen as the political system as a deliberate 
choice (it is artificial), constructed (but based on some 
kind of reason) and its contours depend on circum-
stances (the context and the issues of the day will de-
termine its exact features). For an assessment of the 
merits of federalism he draws on Bryce (1928). These 
advantages range from “uniting commonwealths into 
one nation under one government without extinguish-
ing their separate administrations, legislatures and lo-
cal patriotism” and “the best means of developing a 
new and vast country” to “facilitating self-government” 
and enabling people to “try experiments in legislation 
and administration which could not be safely tried in a 
large centralized country” and that having local legisla-
tures with large powers would relieve the federal legis-
lature from functions that could prove too heavy for it 
(Burgess, 2006a, pp. 15-16). 
Furthermore, borrowing from the moral philoso-
pher Henry Sidgwick (1891), he points to another ma-
jor issue in federalism, namely that there is rarely a 
clear demarcation between the unity of the whole and 
the separateness of the parts. Thus, one should recog-
nize that federalism would be realized only to different 
extents (Burgess, 2006a, p. 21). Finally, he posits that 
there has not really been a sufficient pool of experi-
ences, in the first 30 years after World War II, to devel-
op a single ‘theory’ of federalism (Burgess, 2006a, p. 
45). Rather one should focus on two related factors: (1) 
the degree of independence of the (two) levels of gov-
ernment; and (2) whether the (two) levels of govern-
ment can neither subordinate the other to it, nor act 
completely independent of the other in a range of poli-
cy areas (Burgess, 2006a, p. 45). 
Applying his insights on federalism on two cases 
discussed in this article he comes to the following in-
sights: the Canadian case was one in which federalism 
suited because it served as a way to overcome: (1) the 
political stalemate in the province of Quebec; (2) the 
proximity of the United States (possible threat thereof 
as well as wanting to be a separate from it); and (3) 
forming a national unity (Burgess, 2006a, pp. 84-85). In 
Canada the creation of a federal state emerged with-
out too much controversy in two conferences (Char-
lottetown and Quebec in 1864; and in 1866 in London). 
Clearly Canada fits the broad description of being a 
country that was vast, wide, and new and thus federal-
ism could serve well. 
Burgess analyses the EU in federal context in two 
major books (Burgess, 1989, 2000). In each of these 
books he draws parallels between developments in the 
EU context and those in the area of federalism. In his 
2006 book Burgess devotes a chapter to “The European 
Union as a Federal Model”. In fact Burgess points to 
the fact that the EU does not fit a proper understand-
ing of a federation and thus ends up being a “a new 
kind of federal model the like of which has never be-
fore been seen” (Burgess, 2006a. p. 226). He stresses 
that the process is slow, incremental and lacks big 
foundation moments. To understand the EU as a fed-
eration one needs to understand some of the peculiari-
ties of the EU to which I now turn in the next section. 
4. What Federalism Means in Europe 
Burgess argues that the EU is a unique federal model. 
The characteristics include that it was built by founding 
fathers that saw the EU as needing to be a response to 
the devastation of having had many wars between 
countries such as Germany and France. Richard Grif-
fiths spells out emphatically that the exact genesis of 
the EC, in particular the role of the founding fathers, 
was much more the result of the politics of the day, 
than the specific visionary characteristics of its found-
ers (Griffiths, 2012). Perhaps the most well-known of 
them, the Frenchman Jean Monnet, who incidentally 
travelled through Canada as a young man (Ugland, 
2011), saw the interrelation between economics and 
politics as key to setting up more integration in Europe. 
But rather than starting off building a federation, as a 
great visionary goal, he commenced with supranational 
governance of policy areas that were less political: 
coal, steel, atomic energy and eventually the creation 
of an internal market. He also included a defence 
community, but that plan stranded, as it did not find 
support in the French parliament at the time. Monnet’s 
method was to focus on a cumulative process of inte-
gration: a step-by-step approach. Monnet thought that 
the big federal moment would come gradually after 
functional increase of supranational policies (Burgess, 
2006a, p. 231). Italian political theorist Altiero Spinelli, 
another key figure in Europe’s past, disagreed with this 
implicit sense of automaticity in the Monnet method. 
He felt it was important to organize political power at 
the European level. But Spinelli, in turn, underestimat-
ed the lack of political will to move to a more federal 
design of the EC. Though he was quite influential in 
these early years he was unable to push the federal 
idea further. In the 1980s he masterminded deeper po-
litical powers for the European Parliament and sewed 
numerous seeds in the 1984 Draft treaty establishing the 
European Union. Some of these would end up in the 
Single European Act and in the minds of those eventually 
working on the Maastricht Treaty (Glencross & Trechsel, 
2010; Pinder, 2007). 
One such large constitutional moment that could 
have defined the EU in a way similar to the Philadelph-
ia Convention of 1787, that founded the United States 
of America (USA), or the British North America Act 
(BNA), that created Canada in 1867, was the European 
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Convention that took place in the early 2000s. The 
leaders of the Convention, indeed, realized it could be 
such a foundational moment and took it to the next 
level. Even though the mandate was relatively modest7 
they started referring to the entire legal text they were 
producing as being the creation of a ‘Constitution for 
Europe’. As was mentioned above, the move towards 
such a constitution was not supported by various 
groups of citizens. Yet the eventual Lisbon Treaty, that 
was adopted, was in many ways similar to the Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe (Verdun 2013). 
So, in a roundabout way, the Monnet Method, the in-
cremental path, still seems to be working. 
Burgess (2006a) says about the EU that “both in its 
original conception and its subsequent construction 
the EU has strong federal and confederal elements that 
coexist simultaneously with equally robust intergov-
ernmental and supranational features” (Burgess, 
2006a, p. 245). One of the main reasons that there are 
difficulties recognizing the EU as a federation lies in the 
state system that recognizes nation-states as sovereign 
entities. The origin of study of the EU is in international 
relations (IR)—identifying the relations among member 
states as relations among sovereign nation states in 
this state system. In other words, the EU as a model is 
judged within a context of a world of states. The fact 
that the member states of the EU are today already 
considered full-fledged ‘states’, in this sense, causes 
problems for the conceptualization of the EU as a fed-
eral state with sub-nation-state-level government enti-
ties. In the words of Burgess: “In one particular sense—
that of inter-state relations characterized by intergov-
ernmentalism—the EU is clearly located in the world of 
IR that conventionally classifies it as a confederation 
while in another sense—that of supranationalism—the 
logic of European integration seems to portend the 
transcendence and transformation of the national 
state into a new, overarching, multinational federation. 
Here it would be a federation of existing, mainly ma-
ture, nation states” (Burgess, 2006a. p. 246). In other 
words, the EU has both federal and confederal compo-
nents in its political system. 
5. Federalism in Canada 
The creation of the Canadian federation was an elite-
driven endeavour. There was not much involvement of 
a wide range of citizens or representatives of the popu-
                                                          
7 The mandate included: (1) better division and definition of 
competences; (2) the simplification of the instruments; (3) 
more democracy, transparency and efficiency in the Europe-
an Union; and (4) preparing the way for a ‘constitution’ for 
the people of Europe (simplification and reorganization of 
the treaties, inclusion of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
and the possible adoption of a constitutional text), see 
http://europa.eu/scadplus/european_convention/introducti
on_en.htm 
lation. Also, it was not created to overthrow a regime, 
even if it was aimed at creating a country that was 
breaking free from British colonialism. Nevertheless 
the model chosen still married two types of political 
systems: the British style Westminster model and fed-
eralism. In this sense, although both are highly decen-
tralized, the Canadian and the US models are distinct 
models (Canadian is parliamentary; the US presidential 
with a nation-wide two-party system). The Canadian 
model has on occasion led to a domination of a region-
al party that then gets a say in federal politics in its par-
liamentary system. 
The Canadian federal model can be seen as a multi-
national federation (Gagnon, 2010, p. 50). This type of 
federalism provides measures to ensure that the vari-
ous nations or communities within the federation 
should have the means to ensure that members of all 
national communities can achieve similar standards. 
Multi-national federations do not necessarily manage 
to ensure similar standards but there can be policies 
and government structures to achieve this aspiration. 
In fact, many have argued that the Canadian multi-
national federation has often missed the boat on ac-
commodating the needs of the various nations within 
the Canadian federation. It is one reason why there 
were referendums in Quebec (in 1980 and in 1995) to 
vote on whether Quebec should secede from Canada. 
Similarly, if one looks at the socio-economic and political 
conditions among First Nations communities in Canada, 
it is clear that they are far from “achieving similar stand-
ards”, that is, compared to standards elsewhere in Can-
ada (judging by, for instance, infant mortality, literacy, 
employment levels and life expectancy). 
In this sense the constitution of Canada does not 
accommodate satisfactorily the needs of its nations. As 
Alain-G. Gagnon has argued, there is a lack of “justice” 
in the system (Gagnon, 2010, p. 31). With much of the 
focus on procedural federalism it is possible to over-
look the effects these procedural measures might in ef-
fect have on minority groups—those that make up a 
smaller part of the federation compared to the majori-
ty group. The critics of traditional liberalism have fo-
cused on how this traditional reading does not do 
justice to “deep diversity” (Taylor, 1993, pp. 181-184). 
Authors such as Kymlicka and Tully have criticized Ca-
nadian federalism indicating how adjustments need to 
be made in order to support the needs of these minori-
ty groups, which could lead to more “asymmetrical” 
federalism (Gagnon, 2010, pp. 31-51). It should ensure 
democratic principles are adhered to and that the gov-
ernment levels are accountable by allowing for more 
political participation and a valuation of the diversity of 
cultures amongst the citizens that make up the federa-
tion. Sensitivity to these matters would ensure long-
term stability in the federation. 
Federalism in Canada has been labelled as ‘execu-
tive federalism’ (Smiley 1980; Watts 1988, 1989). It de-
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scribes “the relation between elected and appointed 
officials of the two orders of government” (Smiley, 
1980, p. 91). Or as Watts describes it: a process where-
by intergovernmental negotiations are dominated by 
the executives of the different governments within the 
Canadian federal system (Watts, 1988, p. 3). Much of 
the way people recently characterised Canadian feder-
alism can be traced back to the leadership style of the 
Prime Minister (PM). PM Jean Chrétien was seen to 
meet the Premiers of the provinces if he could have 
some control of the outcome and in a decade he only 
met the Premiers seven times (Wells, 2008). PM Paul 
Martin wanted to meet the premiers more but had a 
different style of trying to get results out of them. The 
most recent conservative federal government for ten 
years under then PM Stephen Harper (2006–2015) had 
a tendency to focus on its own competence and make 
decisions independent of a thorough discussion of the 
matters at the lower level (provinces and territories). In 
return, provinces and territories have had a tendency 
to execute policies without much deliberation among 
the other provinces and territories. Indeed, we have 
found that institutions that facilitate conversations 
among first ministers of the provinces and territories 
(‘first ministers conferences’) have not been called, as 
the Harper did not bring the premiers together at all in 
the last six years of the ten years that he was in office 
as Prime Minister. The current Canadian PM, Justin 
Trudeau, has already met his Premiers and, although it 
is still early days, seems more likely to be keen than his 
predecessor to include this group (Geddes, 2016; The 
Star, 2015). 
6. Comparing the EU to Canada 
Turning to a comparison of Canada to the EU we find 
various interesting overlapping characteristics. If one 
were to assume that we could compare the two politi-
cal systems—that is, the European supra-national level 
could be compared to the federal level in Canada and 
the level of the member states could be compared to 
the provinces and territories in Canada—one could 
come up with the following comparison. 
Let us first turn to the Michael Burgess’s theoretical 
insights on federalism in the cases of Canada and the 
EU. In section 2 we reviewed how a single theory of 
federalism is still lacking. Across the globe a federal de-
sign may be used in cases where there is a process of 
federalisation, which can be the case when an institu-
tional structure is to be created that seeks to mediate 
between multinational entities or a diverse territorial 
space. The European Union had such a moment on dif-
ferent occasions, most recently with the Constitutional 
Treaty in 2003. Had the Treaty Establishing a Constitu-
tion for Europe, signed by heads of state or govern-
ment, been ratified by all (at the time fifteen) member 
states, this document would have constituted a found-
ing document for the next step in federalisation (cf. 
Trechsel, 2005). But, as was mentioned above, there is 
ample evidence that despite the absence of the sym-
bols present in the Constitutional Treaty, the essence 
of it has been incorporated into the Lisbon Treaty that 
was ratified. The Canadian equivalent can be found 
both in the Quebec conference in 1864 (that founded 
Canada), but also the Charlottetown Accord (1992); the 
latter aimed at making changes to the Canadian consti-
tution—to settle the division of powers between the 
federal and provincial governments. This Accord even-
tually also was defeated in a public referendum in Oc-
tober 1992. What we learn from Burgess is that the 
building of a federation is a process; just because there 
have been attempts that failed does not stop it from 
being part of the federal process.  
We looked above at the difference between the 
concept of federalism and federation (Burgess & Gag-
non, 1993, p. xiii; Gagnon, 2010, p. 3; King, 1982). The 
latter refers more to institutions; the former is broader 
and includes traditions, ideology including perhaps the 
advocacy for an end goal. In the EU context, the more 
ideological dimension, in fact, is weak. Very few schol-
ars, citizens, and politician wish to invoke ‘federalism’ 
as an ideology—a path towards deeper integration. 
What describes the developments in the EU much bet-
ter is the concept of ‘federalism’. Furthermore, another 
aspect of federalism, mentioned above, had been the 
fact that a multinational federation is a vehicle to 
acknowledge the existence of various nations within 
the federation and offers a way to accommodate these 
different minorities (Gagnon, 2010, p. 5). Both Canada 
and the EU easily fit this characterisation of multina-
tional federation. Each has distinct nations. The EU to-
day has 28 member states; Canada has numerous 
nations in its midst even though the federal structure 
only accommodates the provinces and territories and 
not so much the first nations.  
Turning to the more institutional characterisation of 
federation, the way Canadian federalism has been 
characterised as ‘executive federalism’ (Smiley, 1980; 
Watts, 1988, 1989), which is dominated by intergov-
ernmentalism, is a characterisation that would fit well 
as a descriptor of the way the EU is governed. Even 
with the recent financial crisis, the subsequent eco-
nomic crisis, the sovereign debt crisis and the most re-
cently the migration crisis, the EU’s mode of 
governance seems dominated by deliberative inter-
governmentalism (Bickerton, Hodson, & Puetter, 
2014). Notwithstanding this descriptor of intergovern-
mentalism (or ‘executive federalism’), the EU did end 
up creating a number of supranational (read: federal) 
institutions (Gocaj & Meunier, 2013; Verdun, 2015b) as 
well as permit one of its federal institutions, the Euro-
pean Central Bank, to play a more prominent role in 
dealing with the various crises (Hodson, 2013). 
Furthermore, in Canada there is a clear distinction 
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between the competence of the federal level and that 
of the provincial/territorial level. In the EU context we 
see a similar distinction in a number of policy-making 
areas. Let us turn to a few policy areas. One of the poli-
cy areas in both Canada and the EU for which respon-
sibility lies with the federal/supranational level of 
governance is international trade policy. Both in the EU 
and in Canada customs, tariffs, quantitative restrictions 
and trade agreements are the responsibility of the 
highest government level. In Canada, day-to-day poli-
cy-making in the area of trade policy is done by a fed-
eral department recently renamed into ‘Global Affairs’ 
(that was in 2013–2015 called the Department of For-
eign Affairs, Trade and Development and before July 
2013 that it was for many years called ‘the Department 
of Foreign Affairs and International Trade’); in the EU 
the European Commission counterpart is the Direc-
torate General ‘Trade’. Decisions on international trade 
agreements, such as the recent ‘political agreement’ 
on the Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement 
(CETA) between Canada and the EU in October 2013, 
were decided upon by Prime Minister Stephen Harper 
of Canada and José Manuel Barroso, then President of 
the European Commission (see also D’Erman, 2016). 
It is remarkable that the EU has focused so much on 
“completing the internal market”. One of the strongest 
drivers of integration in the past four decades has in-
deed been this goal. The Canadian case is less focused 
on this same goal. In fact, one could easily find exam-
ples of the Canadian internal market having more im-
pediments to mobility than does the European Union 
market in those similar cases. For instance, taking a 
bottle of alcohol from one province to another could 
mean one encounters obstacles at the ‘border’ be-
tween the provinces.8 There are also other regulations 
that need to be put in place to improve the mobility 
across the Canadian internal market (Internal Trade 
Secretariat, 2014). These have not been given priority 
in Canada despite the federal government’s goal to 
sign international trade agreements to enhance free 
trade across the Canadian border with other nations. 
Yet the negotiators of the CETA agreement in Canada 
have noted that these negotiations with the EU have 
put pressure on Canadian provinces to remove barriers 
to (internal) trade (Quiring, 2016). 
Another typical federal policy is monetary policy (cf. 
McKay, 2001). The Bank of Canada sets interest rates 
for all of Canada, for its currency: the Canadian dollar. 
In the EU context, not all member states are members 
of the euro area, but those that are face a similar ‘su-
pra-national’ policy to its Canadian counterpart. In the 
EU context the European Central Bank (ECB) executes 
monetary policy (sets interest rates for the euro area). 
                                                          
8 Although a New Brunswick Provincial Court judge recently 
dismissed restrictions on intra-Canada cross-border alcohol 
allowances for personal as unconstitutional (CBC, 2016). 
National central banks do not have authority to set 
their own individual policies insofar as the currency is 
concerned. 
Though monetary policies are unified for the mem-
ber states that have joined the euro area, flanking poli-
cies, such as fiscal policy and the role of what would be 
the federal ministry of finance are different in the EU. 
Within EU economic and monetary union (EMU) these 
policies remain firmly secure at the member state lev-
el, even if there are some rules put in place that aim to 
have the effect that they will lead to a coordination of 
budgetary and fiscal policies (Heipertz & Verdun, 
2010). Furthermore, the EU supra-national level also 
only has a fraction of the budget of what the Canadian 
federal government has to spend, seen that the EU on-
ly has a supranational budget of one per cent of Gross 
Domestic Product. On the flip side, most EU member 
states have national budgets that are higher than what 
Canadian provinces and territories spend. Other policy 
areas are mainly the responsibility of lower level gov-
ernments in both political systems: education, social 
policy, health, local infrastructure and so on (Verdun & 
Wood, 2013a, 2013b). These few examples indicate 
how there are similarities between both systems that 
make it not too far-fetched to imagine that the EU and 
Canada are in a number of ways similar to each other 
in their type of multi-level governance. 
In terms of institutional comparisons, both Canada 
and the EU have a parliament at the federal/supra-
national level. The parliament in Canada is one based 
on the Westminster model. In Europe the European 
Parliament (EP) has over time acquired more powers 
(since 2009, with the entering into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty, it is now the ‘normal’ procedure in the EU to 
need approval from the EP for legislative acts to be-
come law). Although the EP has that ‘normal’ function 
for passing most EU legislative acts, the EP is atypical in 
other ways: parliamentary political party groupings are 
still more an amalgamation of national parties, that ‘sit’ 
together by familiarity rather than a proper, coherent, 
political party with a unified focus (see also Kreppel, 
2006, for an analysis of the EP as a federal body). Simi-
larly, other EU supra-national institutions resemble 
those in federal states: the Court of Justice of the Eu-
ropean Union is the highest court of appeal for EU law 
and in that way is a court similar to the supreme court 
of Canada (O’Brien, in press). Nevertheless, the Court 
of Justice of the EU does not have the power to decide 
over matters that cannot be traced back to some kind 
of legal basis in EU treaties (this means that laws that 
originate in member states and are not regulated by EU 
law, cannot be brought before the Court of Justice of 
the EU). Finally, the European Commission in a number 
of ways resembles a supra-national or ‘federal’ gov-
ernment. It has directorate-generals that resemble the 
ministries. Yet the political body of commissioners 
have not been brought forward through elections in 
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the parliament. Rather those candidates are brought 
forward by the member states governments without 
there being a formal link to the political background of 
these candidates—meaning that the proposed com-
missioner would not necessarily have the same political 
affiliation as the government of the day. Moreover, the 
European Commission does not run on a political plat-
form but rather offers services as if there were no po-
litical mandate for the period of its duration in office. 
Of course, there are indicators that make the two 
polities very different: EU citizens identify more with 
the national, regional and local levels than they typical-
ly do with the supra-national level. Many Canadians 
identify just fine with Canada although some minority 
groups (First Nations; some Quebecers) less so. Having 
said that, it is noteworthy that the EU citizens tend to 
trust their European level institutions more than their 
national level institutions, and this trend has been go-
ing on for a number of years (see Figure 1), although 
most recently trust in European Union institutions is 
falling quicker than trust in national parliaments and 
national governments. 
All in all, the case can be made that both the Euro-
pean Union and Canada have supra-national/federal 
characteristics that are similar, even if a number of 
profound differences remain. 
The relations between Quebec and Canada have 
put significant pressure on the Canadian federation 
even if Canadian federalism has been “one of the most 
resilient and enduring of modern federations” (Bur-
gess, 1990, p. 1). Looking at this case through the work 
of Burgess has shown us that Canadian federalism’s 
strength lies in the way centripetal and centrifugal 
forces offset one another. Canadian federalism has 
managed, even if often imperfectly, to accommodate 
the needs of minorities (in particular the prominent 
Quebec nation), thus making the centralising forces ul-
timately have the upper hand. Recent political devel-
opments in Canada reflect these insights as the 
outcome of elections both provincially and federally 
can be interpreted to mean that there is very limited 
appetite at the moment in another referendum on 
Quebec separation. What still needs more attention is 
the relationship with First Nations, a group of minori-
ties that is still dissatisfied with its status and living 
standard within the federation. This relationship is one 
that needs continuous attention and a correction of 
historical wrongs. 
7. Conclusions 
This article started off examining the concepts of fed-
eralism and federation drawing in particular on the 
work of Michael Burgess. The Europeanist literature of-
fers different insights into when we might call the EU a 
federation. As of yet very few scholars offer the con-
clusion that the EU has already met the threshold that 
the EU could indeed be called a federation. Its leading 
political bodies still miss the autonomy that is typically 
attributed to the highest political body; its citizens are 
not yet identifying with the EU and are not in all bodies 
directly represented. 
 
Figure 1. Trust in institutions: EU, national parliaments and national governments. Source: European Commission (2015, 
p. 8). 
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Nevertheless, what we have learnt from this study 
is that numerous types of federations exist over time 
and space. It does not do any of them justice to try to 
define the terms federalism and federation in a rigid 
fashion. With the help of the comparative work of Bur-
gess we are able to identify building blocks that con-
tribute to an understanding of the specific type of 
federation in a given time and space. In the cases of 
Canada and the EU, Burgess’s insights prove very help-
ful indeed. By focusing at once at the institutional, ad-
ministrative and governmental sides of the equation 
we are able to see how some federations use division 
of labour of who is responsible for what part of the 
tasks and thus have federalism be ‘executive’ or ‘ad-
ministrative’. On the other side of the equation it is 
important to realize that federations are made up of 
different groups, sometimes differing in size, identifica-
tion, social and political needs and thus simple territo-
rial federalism might not work; one needs multi-level 
federalism to accommodate diverse groups. 
Burgess’s work thereby is ideally suited to examine 
the case of the EU. Although there are hardly any 
scholars who would openly state that the EU today re-
sembles a pseudo federation, with the help of Bur-
gess’s insights we can point to the federal features of 
the EU. Comparing the EU to the case of Canada is at-
tractive. Canadian federalism is quite decentralized and 
‘confederal’, multinational, and ‘executive’ so that 
some comparisons are actually striking. Many have ar-
gued that the EU is a sui generis political system. But in 
comparing the nature of the Canadian federation to 
that of the EU enables us to look beyond the specific 
sui generis characteristics of the EU. It offers us a 
toolkit that facilitates a comparison with other polities 
that in turn can offer us insights into what goes on 
within the EU political system. Such an analysis enables 
us to see that the EU is in fact already on a clear federal 
path. Even if it has not been a big bang, its incremental 
steps can clearly be identified as having federal charac-
teristics. In other words, the EU has a considerable 
amount of federal features (federation), but that a fed-
eral tradition, a federal ideology and advocacy to a 
federal goal (federalism) are mostly absent. 
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